As chosen by Twitter followers back in July, this short series – one article a week for the next six weeks – looks at the dissolution of the United Kingdom (“After the UK”).
This series shouldn’t be interpreted as relishing in the prospect of the end of the Union. There’ve been false dawns for nationalists and close calls for Unionists for centuries, but this time everything feels different. Despite having a long history of making last-ditch attempts to save the day when there’s constitutional stress – and I’ll be taking a serious look at some of the ways to potentially save the Union in later parts – the UK can’t bodge its way out of the problems it’s created for itself and requires serious and fundamental constitutional change to survive in the longer-term.
So I start with a look at some of the reasons why the UK has been placed under strain.
What is it?
As Dominic Lawson has said, the British Empire was a shared project. The UK has been held together by the idea (still cited by Unionists in different guises) that the UK is greater than the sum of its parts and had a manifest destiny – a tiny group of islands “punching above its weight” in international affairs and managing to form one of the largest empires in history in the process.
Empires die; it’s an inevitability. But the problem with empires is they come with an attitude that’s harder to shake off – a “Post-Imperial Syndrome”: nostalgia for a former “greatness”, stubbornness, political black-and-white thinking, distrust of foreigners and exceptionalism.
Accepting that the old ways don’t work anymore may, with maturity, result in a move towards multilateralism/international cooperation, more consensual politics and trying to take advantage of globalisation.
One other way – as the UK has long pursued – is to pretend to be a major power just taking time out before finding a new global role which will restore that former greatness. In our case that’s meant the UK acting as the USA’s sidekick and a transatlantic bridge between the US and the EU (now demolished at one end).
How is it damaging the Union?
When discussing the UK’s decline as a global superpower, the focus has often been on the UK’s place in the world and the impact of the Empire. It often overlooks the impact that the loss of imperial power and prestige has had on the internal workings of the UK itself.
Economically, things have changed a lot; the loss of guaranteed markets and predictable levels of trade accelerated the decline of heavy industry and the resulting social problems. Politically-speaking however, the old centralising high-handed imperial structures and attitudes remain present in the instruments of the UK’s government and elements of the media: the UK can never “not work”.
That sense of denial – rejecting the idea that people believe the UK way of doing things isn’t necessarily the best way or even the right way and a refusal to learn from best practice around the world – is in itself a post-imperial hangover: “It’s how it is and how it’s going to be“.
What’s being done to address it?
Not a lot. The UK’s vision and mission statement is still largely dictated by old ideas and those inspired by them (those pushing CANZUK, for example). If anything, the Brexit process and Covid-19 pandemic have amplified it amongst certain sections of society and, in a counter-reaction, bolstered civic nationalism in Scotland and (to a lesser extent) Wales.
What is it?
Following the Second World War, there was broad agreement across the political divide that the state should intervene to boost economic development and improve the standard of living for ordinary citizens.
There were levels of government intervention which would make today’s right-wing press wince: the establishment of the NHS, mass council house-building, mass regional infrastructure development, modernist centrally-planned new towns, collective bargaining, the creation of the Open University, decolonisation, nationalisation and expansion of the welfare state.
Opening the UK’s borders to increased immigration from the newly-formed Commonwealth to tackle labour shortages, as well as increased rights for women entering the workforce in greater numbers, created a stronger social union in the UK on top of the political one by eventually forcing action on issues like low pay, racism and sexism (though with a very long way to go to completely eliminate those problems).
That said, not all of those post-war ideals were good ones. Trade unions played a part in their own downfall, heavy industry came with a heavier price and many new towns are (perhaps incorrectly) seen as brutalist throwbacks.
The UK’s social union has been gradually dismantled – if it ever truly existed in the romanticised ideal listed above.
While organisations like the Welsh Development Agency were set up to accelerate the switch from heavy industry to light industry and services, many parts of the UK were effectively abandoned or at the very least seen as a low priority – Wales and parts of Scotland included, which adds a national element to it when it was carried out by governments which the majority of voters in each nation didn’t support. An argument was gradually developed that the state was doing too much and in Wales the focus shifted to attracting investment from abroad as the UK Government slowly took a back seat or focused their attentions elsewhere.
“Managed decline” was actively discussed at the highest levels of UK Government in relation to Liverpool during the 1980s. Even if it wasn’t officially adopted, it’s easy to imagine the same things being said about post-industrial Wales, North-East England and Glasgow with a nod and a wink.
How is it damaging the Union?
Margaret Thatcher and her cabinets probably didn’t see the borders – what’s good for the goose is good for the gander. But it’s no coincidence that increased civic nationalism at the expense of Unionism has happened since the decline of the post-war consensus and the rise of the individualist, consumer-led economy based on personal services and moving money and property around. Where you lived increasingly mattered as much as your social class.
Helping the least well off in society gradually became unfashionable to both the English centre-left and centre-right as they chased swing voters in the increasingly crucial marginal constituencies in the south of England – “Mondeo Man”, “Worcester Woman”, “Thatcher’s Children” or whatever archetypal demographic pollsters came up with.
The gradual demonisation of the welfare state from the late 1980s onwards – of which post-industrial areas remain fairly reliant on (particularly long-term disability) – has resulted post-2007 in the imposition of policies like disability assessments, the bedroom tax and botched universal credit, which in many cases means even if you “try to do the right thing” (as it’s now dubbed) you get punished.
When UK Government policy has, for decades, been about elevating the socio-economic winners at the expense of the losers, why should anyone be surprised when the losers decide they don’t want to play a rigged game anymore?
What’s being done to address it?
Before the Covid-19 pandemic, the penny finally dropped that there needed to be a “levelling up” between London, the English regions and Wales – less so Scotland.
City deals and the creation of regional and cross-border “powerhouses” have been seen as part of the solution (as well as a possible replacement of EU-led regional policies), as are efforts by devolved governments and English mayors to promote major regeneration and infrastructure projects (the metro schemes in Wales, the 2012 Olympics in East London, High Speed 2 in the English Midlands).
However, HS2 aside the sums of capital spending being talked about are pitiful. The city regions and regional powerhouses seem to be a marketing exercise for what’s already there and little else – and that’s why I’m not that worried about a colonial-style partition of Wales.
Yet again, a UK Government talks the talk but refuses to walk the walk. The pandemic will almost certainly force another rethink of UK-wide economic priorities and will probably result in a retreat to the safe bet of London’s financial sector at the expense of the rest of us: “What’s good for the goose….”
What is it?
The concentration of economic and political power in a single area – in the UK’s case, London and South-East England. There’s always something of an inevitability about power centralising around a capital, but when it goes too far it can actively suck the life out of the peripheral territories. All UK Government departments and the civil service are based in or answerable to London, with some back-office functions and agencies moved out to the devolved nations (DVLA in Swansea, ONS in Newport) or English regions.
DWP/Job Centre Plus aside, the only government department that has a strong semblence of being spread evenly across the UK is the Ministry of Defence – and even then a far lower proportion of the UK military are based in Wales than are recruited from here. Economically, the vast majority of UK companies listed on the London Stock Exchange are headquartered in London. That’s where their taxes are filed, where their economic output is measured and where the high-value work is done.
As a result, money and talent flow to London and it’s become a successful golden goose (London and South East England contribute about 45% of England’s economic output from 32% of England’s population).
The brain drain and excessive capital investment to the south-east of England are compensated via fiscal transfers/”subsidies”; according to official estimates, only London and South East England pay more into the UK pot than they take out, but that’s always going to be the case when most of the companies and political power structures are based there and working to maximise the return on investment there.
How is it damaging the Union?
It’s created a “them and us” resentment in both directions as well as a continuing cycle of peripheral neglect. This isn’t unique to the UK; there’s the same problem – perhaps greater – in Spain and France as well as the famous north-south divide in Italy. There are also pockets of severe poverty within so-called wealthy areas, such as parts of East London and the Kent coast.
A lot of the media commentary from the centre suggests the rest of us should be grateful for simply sharing an island with London and our utility within the UK seems to depend on how we’re able to feed London; they’re “paying for the rest of us” afterall.
Meanwhile it’s become too easy to point to excessive investment in projects such as Crossrail (when projects in Wales and elsewhere are scrapped, like rail electrification and the Swansea tidal lagoon) as examples of “the Union failing Wales” and more peripheral regions of England. Spain and France, by contrast, have made an effort to include every single area in their respective high speed rail programmes. “Value for money”/cost-benefit analysis considerations often mean that in the UK, the case for capital expenditure is focused on the economic return not the utility or social impact.
In properly functioning federal systems there’s hardly any secessionism. If you look at Germany (where Prussia used to be as dominant as England is within the UK) while there’s still a big divide between the former West and East German states, the regional disparities – considered to be a serious problem there – are much smaller than those between the nations and regions of the UK.
As a result, Germany tends to have successful cities everywhere and is far more productive and seemingly more united despite being carpet bombed 75 years ago and having to deal with a difficult reunification process. The Netherlands has fairly strong regions and urbanisation beyond Amsterdam too and they’re still a unitary state with relatively weak devolution to provincial governments.
In the UK, we’ve put everything in a London-shaped basket. There’s a warning in this for Wales too given the post-devolution tensions between Cardiff (which risks becoming a mini-London in a good way and a bad way) and northern and western areas.
What’s being done to address it?
Devolution (including regional mayors in England and limited tax powers for Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland) is itself a reaction to this, but “power devolved is power retained” and it gives an illusion of decentralisation when the UK remains very centralised. Although it would be politically difficult to roll back devolution, all authority still comes from the centre as demonstrated in the recent Internal Market Bill.
There’s still a single (increasingly ineffective) UK civil service. The UK Government has a poor understanding and respect for the devolved nations as governments in their own right and the present UK Government’s attitude is reminiscent of Margaret Thatcher’s attitude to the former Greater London Council – it just provincials getting in the way and stepping out of line.
Additionally, due to some principles of the UK’s uncodified constitution a federal solution is currently impossible. There’s a tendency for Whitehall to forget about peripheral areas, yet at the same time a reluctance to relinquish powers to them. In a household, it would be called coercive control.
What is it?
England (as it currently stands) makes up 83% of the UK’s population, 86% of the UK’s economic output and elects 82% of the UK’s MPs.
In the absence of formal four-nation working, it’s impossible to have a “Union of Equals”. England, by virtue of its size, sets the political, cultural and economic narrative for the whole UK – perhaps without realising it or whilst taking that power for granted. That’s not their fault, it’s just a demonstration of the lop-sided nature of the Union.
The devolved nations have little to no influence on the outcome of UK level elections or governance – the most (in)famous Welsh example was when 35 of 36 Welsh MPs voted against the construction of the Tryweryn reservoir to serve Liverpool but were outvoted. The UK Government wears the hat of a UK and English Government at the same time and it’s often hard to tell which one is prioritised. To a lesser extent, this is the same for the UK Parliament as well.
How is it damaging the Union?
It’s much easier for the other nations and national identities (such as Cornwall) to be squeezed out and nationalism is a backlash. The only way you can get attention at UK level is by actively agitating for it through “bad behaviour” – which is why Scotland and Northern Ireland get far more attention from the centre than Wales does.
Nationalists will argue that as we know we’re not going to be able to affect change at a UK level or get the governments we – as nations – vote for, or be treated with the appropriate respect and esteem as equal partners in a political union (with a federal solution presently unworkable), then we might as well go it alone.
What’s being done to address it?
Devolution and the Barnett Formula are a reaction to this, but not a long-term solution. As mentioned earlier, devolution can be undone by its very nature, while the Barnett Formula is a blunt instrument designed to over-fund Scotland to compensate for oil and gas revenues – largely at Wales’ expense.
From the opposite direction, “English Vote for English Laws” in the UK House of Commons was introduced from 2015 onwards to ensure only English (or English & Welsh or English, Welsh and Northern Irish) MPs could veto UK-level laws that affect England (or EnglandandWales or England, Wales & Northern Ireland).
This still means Welsh MPs can be outvoted on an issue of specific Welsh national interest that lies within the remit of the UK Government.
What is it?
“Britishness” has traditionally been difficult to distinguish from an extension of “Englishness”.
Census data and recent opinion polling show that there’s a tug-of-war between an overarching British/UK sense of identity and the identity of the UK’s constituent nations (including Cornwall) – particularly amongst white people; evidence consistently shows that people from backgrounds other than white are more likely to identify as British than with the UK’s nations.
How is it damaging the Union?
With a gradually declining sense of “Britishness” – sentimental and practical – the UK’s days are perhaps numbered. The national identities of the UK haven’t been eliminated or subsumed which suggests a permanence to them which can never be fully relinquished for the sake of the Union, even if they’re only tolerated at best. We all know what the metropolitan press thinks of the Welsh language, for instance, when it’s as British as anything else originating from the islands.
The Conservatives have become an out-and-out English nationalist party in their approach to Brexit and other issues, nationalists run Scotland and Labour in Wales often adopt a soft Welsh nationalism as a reaction to Tory rule at a UK level.
The process might be irreversible because it’s hard to see how there can be a counter-reaction without it coming across as fascistic (given that the less showy and more inclusive British identity has been replaced by chauvinism) or bolstering support for secession.
What’s being done to address it?
Instead of presenting a positive vision of Britishness and the Union, unionists have now largely been reduced to sloganeering, denial, appeals to nostalgia (the obsession with World War II is pathological) and threats – which is a sure a sign as any that it’s becoming a case as to when the UK will dissolve rather than if. There’s no reason for unionists to be so tetchy or near resignation (in the case of David Melding) about it either because all of these problems are fixable. There just has to be compromise and that’s something unionists may have the mistaken impression they’ve already done too much of when they’ve barely gone a quarter of the way.
To make matters worse, many of the common institutional symbols of Britishness – the military, the Royal family, the BBC and the Westminster system – have been hobbled by scandals, austerity, incompetence or public mistrust.
Any future for the UK will have to fully accommodate a multi-national reality, but the UK Government is still continuing a two-faced act of being the UK and English Government at the same time, which has manifested itself in its policy decisions on Brexit, Covid-19 and other matters.
What is it?
It’s a bit strange that one of the UK’s great achievements in diplomacy could play its part in its downfall, but it’s more by accident than on purpose.
The Good Friday Agreement (and later St Andrews Agreement) set out a political settlement between the traditions of Northern Ireland, including power-sharing, devolution, cross-border co-operation and a statement that the people of Northern Ireland have a right to self-determination. Although dissident paramilitary groups remain and violence still occasionally flares up, the settlement has held steady.
Just a few decades ago, the Republic of Ireland was a parochial poor man of Europe and one of the few remaining outposts of a conservative Catholicism. Economically and socially, the Republic of Ireland has since caught up and exceeded Northern Ireland, becoming – with a few exceptions – more prosperous, more liberal and arguably more outward-looking than the north and the UK.
How is it damaging the Union?
The “accident” I mentioned is, of course, Brexit – which is putting a lot of strain on the Good Friday Agreement. I’ll come back to that later, but Northern Ireland’s Remain vote and unique position of sharing a land border with an EU member state and a sea border with the rest of the UK has complicated Brexit negotiations enormously and could inflame inter-community tensions if not properly addressed.
The demographics hint that a Catholic majority in Northern Ireland will happen in the next decade or so and that would, notionally, mean the chances of a referendum approving a United Ireland or a redrawing of the border will increase too.
While a United Ireland shouldn’t necessarily impact the Union on the island of Great Britain (if anything it would have made Brexit go a lot smoother), it would symbolically be a major defeat for British Unionism given the historic importance of Northern Ireland to Unionism as an ideology.
What’s being done to address it?
Northern Ireland has proven to be a major complication in Brexit negotiations, with various fudged solutions ranging from a mythical technological border control to Northern Ireland remaining half-in, half-out of the EU.
It’s promped the Internal Market Bill, which rips up a lot of what’s been negotiated to date and could well place the entire Union under threat given the negative reaction to it in Scotland and sections of Wales. It’s a seemingly desperate attempt by the UK Government to impose their authority or engage in a bit of gunboat diplomacy. It’s a mess.
What is it?
The different devolved administrations (including English mayors) all have different powers and there hasn’t been an appropriate explanation as to why this should be the case other than historical precedent and “tradition”.
Northern Ireland and Scotland have significantly more powerful devolution settlements compared to Wales, including powers over the administration of welfare and extra tax powers. Crown dependencies like the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands have control over pretty much everything except defence and some aspects of foreign policy. Instead of levelling-up Wales to match Scotland, the reserved powers model introduced for Wales in 2014 has seen the UK Government micromanage the powers it retains control over, including some which are downright bizarre or unjustifiable.
The obvious bone of contention at the moment is criminal justice and retaining a joint legal jurisdiction with England. The mayors of Manchester and London have some measure of control over policing, but Wales doesn’t despite the Welsh Government and Welsh local authorities providing the bulk of police funding here.
How is it damaging the Union?
Constitutional change in the UK often consists of temporary stop-gaps dressed up as revolutionary reforms.
While an uncodified constitution has its advantages, the failure to set out a clear and uniform devolution model causes unnecessary conflict between governments.
There’s also a “begging bowl” effect when the devolved governments realise they can’t do what they would like to (in otherwise devolved areas) and have to press for more powers. It creates an impression that some parts of the UK are treated more favourably and held in higher esteem than others – usually for the wrong reasons (which I come back to later).
Parliamentary sovereignty is also a major roadblock to a long-term solution.
A federal UK should, on paper, maintain the Union whilst granting as much power as is reasonable and practical to do so to the UK’s respective nations on an equal basis (“principle of subsidiarity”).
However, under parliamentary sovereignty the quasi-federal states would never have exclusive authority to enforce their own laws, with the threat that policies and legislation could always be undone from the centre – which is completely incompatible with federalism. A confederal UK can’t exist either because confederations have to be formed by sovereign states and the constituent nations of the UK are not sovereign.
What’s being done to address it?
The pace of constitutional change in the UK has traditionally been glacial; there’s been talk of reforming the House of Lords for more than a century.
Discussions about a federal or confederal UK (or a constitutional convention) have started within Labour (even Plaid Cymru), while the Lib Dems have talked of federalism for decades. The problem is that when they’ve been in a position to deliver on this, they’ve fudged it. The Conservatives are seemingly opposed to any further devolution, while there are active campaigns to roll-back devolution.
Those of us who would’ve once been open to “devo max”, federalism or confederalism have walked out after getting tired of waiting for a date that stood us up; the federalists have just asked for their fifteenth glass of water after coming back to the same restaurant every night for a week.
What is it?
The burden for the potential break-up of the UK is perhaps unfairly weighted on the shoulders of the UK Government and unionists. It’s right to acknowledge the role the devolved governments have unwittingly played too.
Westminister and the UK Government have long been blamed for most misfortunes befalling Wales (and presumably it’s the same in Scotland too). While the UK Government has often been all too keen to point out failures by the devolved administrations to make themselves look not-quite-as-terrible-as-they-are, their very existence often presents the devolved governments with their own convenient get-out-of-jail-free card: “It’s Westminister’s/Whitehall’s fault!” Arguments usually revolve around money.
Attacks on the Welsh Government are often presented as attacks on devolution and/or Wales, while it seems a month doesn’t go by without yet another “slap in the face for Wales” – however minor. Differing policies between the different nations have been weaponised and (sometimes wrongly) used as examples of hypocrisy – for example, Labour in Scotland criticising an SNP policy that Labour are themselves enacting in Wales.
It dampens scrutiny and forces people who don’t consider themselves nationalists to wrap themselves in a flag, framing disagreements between political parties or governments as being between nations.
How is it damaging the Union?
If the UK was a family, social services would’ve been called.
Instead of the Union being held together by a sense of shared purpose – with “good behaviour” being rewarded – the devolved administrations have learned that you often only get the attention of the UK Government and UK media when agitating to damage the UK. That could be through (the typically Welsh response of) the angry letter, non-cooperation, the threat of independence or (in the case of Northern Ireland) security threats and the potential for peace to break down.
Wales should have been the beneficiary of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum as a demonstration of our “loyalty”. It was the opportune time to reform the Barnett formula into a needs-based one and improve the Welsh devolution settlement. The opposite happened. Although “The Vow” never materialised, Scotland was rewarded for contemplating leaving the UK with additional fiscal, economic and social policy powers and now it seems a section of the Welsh public realises it’s probably a path we have to follow too if we’re going to have any sort of leverage.
What’s being done to address it?
The UK Government still has full control over the constitution and can – and probably will – seek to block any attempt at a second independence referendum in Scotland (should the SNP win big next year) which will play right into the SNP’s hands.
Recent moves on the post-Brexit “internal market” and not-so-subtle anti-devolution language from senior Conservatives are absolute gifts. They don’t get it at all – but I hope they keep up the good work.
What is it?
There are “good” reasons as to why the Union may be drawing to a close. It’s not all about constitutional clashes or institutional breakdowns.
Devolution was established to ensure decisions affecting Wales and Scotland were directly made in the respective nations. It’s been far from perfect, but it’s also meant that Scotland and Wales have been able to make decisions, laws and policies which they otherwise wouldn’t have been able to.
Some of the policies have become popular – free prescriptions in Wales (and later Scotland) and free university tuition in Scotland, for example.
To an extent, it’s seen Wales and Scotland realise their potential and move towards political maturity (though this has happened in Scotland to a greater extent than Wales), while in Northern Ireland it’s played a part in a return to normality after decades of civil war. The natural endgame of political maturity is autonomy – which can either take the form of a formal federal arrangement or independence.
How is it damaging the Union?
The UK Government and UK Parliament have never been particularly popular, but they’re more unpopular and distrusted than ever before.
Big differences in policy between the UK/England and the rest of the UK/devolved administrations have always been there, but the Covid-19 pandemic brought them into sharper focus both to audiences within the devolved nations and the UK as a whole.
At the moment, in Wales it’s a case of, “We can do some things better by ourselves and trust the Welsh Government and Senedd to represent our interests, but are maybe not ready or don’t need independence”, but in Scotland they seem to be much further along.
What’s being done to address it?
The UK Government are keen to (rightly) point out that they play a big role in the lives of people across the UK, not just in England – the Covid-19 furlough scheme, regional growth deals and Internal Market Bill are examples.
The problem is that what works for parts of England won’t necessarily work for Wales, Scotland etc. and the failure to properly take into account the views of the devolved governments and parliaments means any legitimate attempt by the UK Government to exercise its control will be portrayed (rightly or wrongly) as a power grab.
Reversing devolution won’t solve any of these issues either – the equivalent of sticking their fingers in their ears and humming God Save the Queen – and will probably make matters worse by radicalising nationalism. Any long-term solution to keeping the Union together has to involve strong self-government for the nations as a demonstration of unionists’ confidence that the UK can still be held together in a looser, more collaborative, less metrocentric format.
What is it?
The process by which the UK has left the European Union, starting with the 1975 referendum “No” campaign right through to the 2016 referendum and the (as of posting) ongoing negotiations on the precise terms of the UK’s post-Brexit relationship (or no relationship at all).
How is it damaging the Union?
You can argue it’s linked to the post-imperial syndrome mentioned earlier, though the reasons behind Brexit are more complicated than that.
The obvious way it’s damaged the Union is the emphatic Remain vote in Scotland and (as mentioned earlier) Northern Ireland in 2016, which has resulted in a nationalist-led Scotland being forced to leave the EU against their will, prompting the “major change in circumstances” which will be used to justify a second independence referendum (polls suggesting it’s far more winnable than in 2014).
I’ve already mentioned Brexit’s impact on Northern Ireland. There’s an imminent threat of a “hard border” (with customs checks and alike) between the Republic and the north and potentially, in certain circumstances, between the north and Great Britain.
While Wales voted Leave, the process of leaving the EU has caused tensions between the Welsh and UK governments because efforts by the Senedd and Welsh Government to protect Welsh interests during the withdrawal process (not stop Brexit itself, which they couldn’t do) have largely been ignored.
What’s being done to address it?
The entire process is being driven by the UK Government and seeing as foreign relations are a reserved matter, constitutionally that’s the only way it can be done.
All but the most ardent/scorched earth Leavers will concede (at the very least on the quiet) that Brexit has been handled appallingly by the UK Government. Theresa May’s imposition of “red lines” put a slow puncture in the process and, resultingly, the EU has run rings around them.
Promises have been broken – such as the devolved nations having a say in future trade deals. Nearly every single statement made about how easy and stress-free the Brexit process would be has turned out to be complete bullshit.
The issue is that as the UK Government wears an English and UK hat at the same time, the specific interests of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have been marginalised. The particularly dangerous element is a failure to view the new post-Brexit pan-UK frameworks as a means of formalising co-operation between distinct nations with their own needs, instead of enforcing the views of Whitehall and the Conservatives on everyone.
The more the UK tells the devolved administrations to “do as you’re told” instead of seeking to build consensus, the more strain it’ll place on the Union.