(Title Image: Nordic Council)
Independence raises a lot of questions about the future, but if the UK did dissolve, that doesn’t necessarily mean close co-operation between the nations of Great Britain and Ireland would necessarily stop. Based on historic precedent, the most stable secessions in modern times are often preceded by voluntary organisations (or looser political unions) made up of the nations which were formerly in union. So the question is: “Assuming the UK did – at some point – dissolve, what could replace it?”
Any post-UK body doesn’t necessarily (but ideally it would) have to involve all of the former UK nations (Could a Celtic Union work?). There are a range of options, including a looser political union, a free trade association to the “No Deal Brexit” style scenario of no formal intergovernmental cooperation whatsoever.
In this option, the UK still exists (to a certain extent). A confederation would mean Wales, Scotland etc. wouldn’t be independent, but they would have sovereign status and could leave the union at any time whilst being fully self-governing in all policy matters not strictly assigned to the Union. All of the nations would have to be treated as equals.
The Union under this model would have a familiar feel to it but at a working level would be very different; matters like welfare, criminal justice, broadcasting etc. would be controlled at the national rather than Union level. It’s likely that the monarchy would remain in place as a titular head of state, while there would also be a single military, single citizenship and single foreign policy.
The Union government would be a lot weaker and smaller with a greater share of power balanced in favour of the nations. Decision-making would likely be far more collaborative than a federal system, possibly with a collective leadership.
There would continue to be a Union parliament – though probably much smaller than the existing UK Parliament. Politically, you would expect parties in each nation to run independently of each other and then form political alliances/parliamentary groups at the union level (similarly to how the EU Parliament works) – so, for example, there would be an independent Welsh Labour party (or equivalent), forming a broad centre-left coalition with other centre left parties from the rest of the Union.
The member states are likely to have pretty extensive financial powers and would likely keep most of the money they raise. The Union would still levy direct taxes, while any method to rebalance finances/fiscal transfers would likely not be as extensive as under the Barnett Formula, instead topping up what the individual nations already raise in revenues.
Whilst being slightly ironic, the EU provides a workable model for a post-Brexit, post-UK body (presumably existing outside the EU).
Each of the member states would be politically independent and would only agree to share sovereignty in certain policy areas.
One of the advantages with a “Soft Confederation” is membership could expand. This could, in the short-term, include Gibraltar, the Isle of Man, Channel Islands and the British Overseas Territories, effectively creating a mini Anglophone trading bloc and single market. The Common Travel Area (with Irish input/observer status) could evolve into a free movement protocol that could be included in negotiations for new trade agreements.
The bloc would collectively negotiate trade deals (much as the EU does), with a Commission appointed to act as the Union’s administrators, overseen and scrutinised by an elected parliament and an executive Council of Ministers (made up of the heads of government of the member states). The Union would have legislative powers, with directives needing to be applied to domestic law – much in the same way EU rules had to be.
Depending on precisely how involved the Union would be in shared policy areas, the financial contribution from members could vary quite significantly.
A big step down from an EU-style political union, a Benelux model would largely focus on developing and refining intergovernmental agreements in relevant policy areas.
It would lack some of the bureaucracy of a more formal political union, but with the added benefits of a free trade agreement and a free movement area. Most of the institutions would be fairly small and easy to manage and there won’t be reams and reams of directives and protocols coming down from the top without the full input of the respective member state governments.
It would be debatable as to whether the member states would negotiate external free trade agreements as a bloc or individually.
This is much like the Benelux and EU model but more focused on trade. Like the EU model, the post-UK body would be a British trading bloc, effectively becoming an Anglophone counterpart (as the name suggests) to the EFTA.
It won’t get involved in lengthy tangling agreements. Directives and would be pared-back quite significantly to the point of most people barely noticing they’re there.
The big issue with this model would be the lack of a customs union which could, potentially, mean cross-border trade between the former UK nations would require a customs declaration and possibly customs checks – though a customs union could be negotiated as part of the founding treaty.
Like the Baltic Assembly (and to a certain extent, the Nordic Council), this model would see the national governments take a step back, leaving matters to their respective national parliaments.
This model would be far looser than anything listed above as it wouldn’t come with any binding agreements. It would be a forum for developing common positions in certain policy areas which may or may not lead to separate treaties or agreements being drafted and signed by the member states.
This model wouldn’t satisfy those who want a closer working relationship between the former UK nations after independence, or some sort of a formal post-UK political union (hard confederation, soft confederation).
As long as the Common Travel Area still exists, some of the most commonly-raised cross-border issues would be addressed. That said, matters such as like customs, free trade and any cross-border issues not otherwise covered by the Common Travel Area would need to be negotiated individually.
This effectively means total independence in a “splendid isolation” context – and I doubt many people want that.
There would be no successor organisation to the United Kingdom and any cross-border agreements would need to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis – probably bilaterally between Wales and England/Scotland/Northern Ireland/Crown Dependencies or in a series of summits between the former UK nations.
Barring the continued existence of the Common Travel Area, this model would result in a “hard border” between the former UK nations, meaning passport and customs checks.
Under Commonwealth traditions, Commonwealth members aren’t “foreign” to each other (assuming the former UK nations actually remained in the Commonwealth), but Commonwealth rights are fairly limited.
The final part will look at the potential personal, political, economic and social/cultural impact of the dissolution of the United Kingdom.