The next two pieces in this series on transport will be a bit meatier, looking at where Wales might be going wrong – as well as where we might be ahead of the curve – in terms of transport policy.
There were different ways to approach this: looking at each method of transport in turn; a SWOT analysis; a straightforward comparison with other countries.
In the end, I’ve opted to stick to a half dozen or so “big” strategic areas. So it won’t include local issues such as the Newport M4, “my train didn’t turn up on time”, not building a north-south motorway or a failure to plan for major events in Cardiff by TfW. It’s going to be more general than that. Specifics will come in later parts.
For whatever reason, it’s very difficult to get anything big built, transport-wise. When it does happen it’s often over budget and long-delayed.
I should make it clear that this isn’t just an issue for the Welsh Government. It’s just as much a UK Government and local government problem too.
Perhaps the longest-running example within Wales is the Newport bypass. It’s not that the decision was taken to cancel it. It’s that it’s been on the table since the 1980s and the closest we’ve ever come to anything being built is a few compulsory purchase orders in the late 2010s.
At one point the project was costed at around £300-400million but this ballooned to £1billion+ at the time it was cancelled (some estimates being closer to £2billion).
Projects that do eventually make it off the drawing board have their own problems. All six phases of A465 dualling between Abergavenny and Hirwaun were originally due to be completed by 2009 for around £270million (at 2000 prices; equivalent to around £580million in 2023)1. As of summer 2023, the final two sections are still under construction (expected to be completed in 2025) and the total cost of all six sections will be more than £1billion.
Roads come under a lot of scrutiny for this for obvious reasons, but we should be increasingly concerned about cost overruns and delays to projects like the South Wales Metro too.
Transport for Wales has, to their credit, been transparent on this2. In practical terms, it means the project faces a minimum £307million cost overrun (taking the cost to £1.05billion, a 41% increase) and at least a year’s delay until completion (sometime in 2024).
It’s the same case for smaller projects. Those of you who read Oggy Bloggy Ogwr too will be familiar with the (at time of writing) 22-year saga of Brackla station.
The question now is “Why?” The only people qualified to give a serious answer to that are engineers, transport experts and economists, but for the sake of argument it’s likely be a mix of:
- Delays caused by changing political priorities, under-resourced planning departments and legal challenges.
- Over-engineering encouraged by design guidelines and standards that are set too high; also an increased focus on architectural excellence over functionality.
- “Optimism bias” during bids for major infrastructure contracts leads to underestimates of the cost and timescales involved.
- “Sunken cost fallacy” – sticking with a big project long after the point it should have been cancelled because so much time and money has already been invested in it.
- Complications caused by Brexit in sourcing construction materials and hiring experienced workers from abroad.
- Skills shortages in construction and engineering amongst the domestic workforce.
- Unforeseen events impacting supply chains and timescales (i.e. Covid pandemic, war in Ukraine).
1. Audit Wales (February 2020). “A465 Section 2 – preliminary findings” (p6). Available at: https://www.wao.gov.uk/sites/default/files/pdf_20_11.pdf
2. Transport for Wales (4th April 2023). “South Wales Metro final cost re-evaluation”. Available at: https://news.tfw.wales/blog/south-wales-metro-final-cost-re-evaluation
